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CUTTING BACK: 
REVISIONS TO DODD-
FRANK DERIVATIVES 
RULES 
By Gary E. Kalbaugh and Alexander F. 
L.Sand 
Gary E. Kalbaugh is a Director and Assistant 
General Counsel of ING Financial Holdings 
Corp. and a Special Professor of Law at the 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra 
University. He is the author of Derivatives 
Law and Regulation (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 2014). Alexander F. L. Sand is a 
regulatory lawyer working in government. 
He has advised clients in regulatory compli-
ance matters arising under the Dodd-Frank 
Act and related rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission and National Futures 
Association. 
I. Introduction 
From the onset of the Financial Crisis until 
recently the prevailing winds have blown 
mostly in one direction: toward greater regula-
tion of the off-exchange derivatives market. 
Emblematic of this trend is the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act ("Dodd-Frank"), passed in 2010, which 
President Obama described as "reform [that] 
will . . . rein in the abuse and excess that 
nearly brought down our financial system. 
[Dodd-Frank] will finally bring transparency 
to the kinds of complex and risky transactions 
that helped trigger the financial crisis."1 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion ("CFTC"), under the direction of Gary 
Gensler, did much to carry out this mandate. 
As of December 31, 2014, the CFTC had final-
ized 50 rules required to be promulgated under 
Dodd-Frank, more than any other single 
regulator. 2 In addition to promulgating rules 
mandated by Dodd-Frank, the CFTC under 
~ 
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Gensler provided a vocal pro-regulatory cul-
tural vision. For example, a few months prior 
to passage of Dodd-Frank, he argued: 
In the last three decades, the over-the-counter 
derivatives marketplace has grown up. It is 
certainly no longer in its embryonic stage, but 
it remains unregulated. From total notional 
amounts of less than $1 trillion in the 1980s, 
the notional value of this market has ballooned 
to more than $300 trillion in the United States 
- that's more than 20 times the size of the 
American economy; the contracts have be-
come much more standardized; and rapid ad-
vances in technology - particularly in the last 
ten years - facilitate more efficient trading. 
While so much of this marketplace has 
changed significantly, the constant has been 
that it is still dealer-dominated. 
When a corporation or another end-user wants 
to hedge a risk, they go to their bank and get a 
price quote. When they enter into transactions, 
those transactions largely stay on the books 
with their banks. The price is not discovered 
on transparent trading venues, such as ex-
changes, and the risk is not transferred from 
the dealer's books to a central clearinghouse. 
This leaves significant risk in the system, risk 
that a year ago was borne by the taxpayers in 
the form of the largest financial bailout in 
history. 
Much like the debate after the last great crisis 
in the 1930s about potential regulation for both 
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the futures. and the securities markets, we are 
now debating whether the over-the-counter 
derivatives market should be regulated. While 
the recent crisis seems to have eased and many 
banks are repaying TARP money, I believe 
that we still must enact regulatory reform to 
promote transparency and reduce risk in the 
evolving over-the-counter derivatives 
markets.3 
Recently, however, these pro-regulatory winds 
have shifted and several notable provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act have been significantly scaled back, 
including provisions that were centerpieces of the 
original Act. In the futures and derivatives context, 
the most significant of these changes are the effective 
repeal of section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the 
"Swap Push-Out Rule") and alteration of the margin 
requirements for swap dealers and major swap 
participants. Additionally, deadlines for complying 
with portions of section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(the "Volcker Rule"4) and for non-US swap dealers to 
comply with transaction-level swap requirements 
were significantly extended. Whether these rollbacks 
represent a targeted tailoring of the Dodd-Frank 
regulatory framework or signify a broader change in 
regulatory climate is yet to be seen. 
This article will survey the affected rules and how 
they have changed. Section II of this article will focus 
on the Swap Push-Out Rule, Section III will discuss 
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the commercial end-user exemption to the margin 
requirements for uncleared swaps, Section IV will 
discuss postponements to the implementation of the 
Volcker Rule, Section V will discuss the expanded 
relief with respect to covered funds transactions for 
parties using the "solely outside the United States" 
exemption to the Volcker Rule, and Section VI will 
discuss relief with respect to CFTC transaction-level 
swap requirements. 
II. Swap Push-Out Rule 
Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act (known as the 
"Swap Push-Out Rule"), as originally passed, prohib-
ited entities engaged in many swaps activities from 
receiving federal assistance, effectively requiring 
swap trading operations to be pushed out from bank 
entities into non-bank affiliates. Specifically, banks 
significantly engaged in swaps activity would be un-
able to offer Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
("FDIC") insurance5 to their depositors or to access 
the Federal Reserve Discount Window.6 Significant 
exceptions were provided for insured depository 
institutions engaged in interest rate and foreign ex-
change swaps, credit default swaps referencing an as-
set national banks were permitted to invest in, and any 
other swap entered into as a hedge against risk 7 None-
the less, the law had the effect of requiring non-bank 
affiliates of banks to engage in many swaps transac-
tions in which the bank would otherwise engage. 
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Risk Mitigation Act's provisions exempting com-
mercial end-users from margin requirements apply 
equally to captive finance companies and, so long as 
the CFTC continues to exclude small banks from the 
definition of a "financial entity," small banks. Note 
that the Commodity Exchange Act-requires the CFTC 
to "consider" excluding small banks from the defini-
tion of a "financial entity." Commodity Exchange Act 
§ 2(h)(7)(C)(ii). 
40Letter from The Coalition. for Derivatives End-
Users, Re: End-User Support for End-User Provisions 
in the Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small 
Business Burdens Act (H.R. 37), January 6, 2015, 
available at http://www.nam.org/Issues/Coroorate-Fin 
ance-Management/Coalition-for-Derivatives-End-Us 
ers-Supports-CTU-Fix-in-Rep-Fitzpatrick-Bill.pdf. 
41Remarks by the President on Financial Reform. 
42Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, Prohibiting Certain High 
Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Hold-
ing Companies: Statement of Paul Volcker, S. Hrg. 
11-771, Feb. 2, 2010. Thefederal agencies tasked with 
promulgating regulations implementing the Volcker 
Rule were the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the CFTC. 
43See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving 
Extension of Conformance Period Under Section 13 
of the Bank Holding Company Act, Dec. I8, 2014, 
available at http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov/newsevent 
s/press!bcreglbcreg20 I41218al.pdf. 
44See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary 
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships 
with, Hedge Fund and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 5536; 79 Fed. Reg. 5808; Federal Reserve Board, 
Order Approving Extension of Conformance Period. 
45See Statement Regarding the Treatment of Col-
lateralized Loan Obligations Under Section 13 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act, April 7, 20I4, available 
at http://www. federalreserve.gov /newsevents/presslb 
creglbcreg20 I40407 a I. pdf. 
460rder Approving Extension of Conformance Pe-
riod at 4. 
47See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(d)(I)(H) & (I); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 248.13(b ). 
4612 C.F.R. § 248.13(b)(I). 
49I2 C.F.R. § 248.13(b)(l)(iii). 
5
°Federal Reserve Board, Volcker Rule Frequently 
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Asked Questions, Feb. 27, 2015, available at http://w 
ww.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/fag. 
htm#13. 
51 A "swap dealer" is defined as any person who: 
(1) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps, (2) makes a 
market in swaps, (3) regularly enters into swaps with 
counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its 
own account, or (4) engaged in any activity causing 
the person to be known in the trade as a dealer or mar-
ket maker in swaps. Commodity Exchange Act 
§ la(49). However, entities engaging in de minimis 
swap dealing activity are excepted from the definition. 
Commodity Exchange Act§ Ia(49)(D). 
52CFTC, Factsheet: Interpretive Guidance and 
Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, available at http://www.cftc.gov/u 
crn/groups/public/@newsroorn/documents/file/crossb 
order factsheeL-final.pdf. Entity-level requirements 
relate to: (I) capital adequacy, (2) chief compliance 
officer, (3) risk management, (4) swap data record-
keeping, (5) swap data reporting, and (6) large trader 
reporting requirements. !d. 
53CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69, Applicability 
of Transaction-Level Requirements to Activity in the 
United States, at p. 2, Nov. 14, 2013, available at htt 
p://www.cftc.gov/ucrn/groups/public/lrlettergeneralld 
ocuments/letter/13-69 .pdf. 
54CFTC No-Action Letter 14-140, Extension of 
No-Action Relief: Transaction-Level Requirements 
for Non-US. Swap Dealers, Nov. 14, 2014, available 
at http://www .cftc.gov/ucrn/ groups/public/lrlettergen 
eral/documents/letter/14-140.pdf. 
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THE FLASH CRASH CASE 
AGAINST SARAO-WILL THE 
CFTC PREVAIL? 
By Professor Ronald Filler and Professor Jerry 
WMarkham 
Ronald Filler is a Professor of Law and the Director 
of the Financial Services Law Institute at New York 
Law School ("NYLS"). He has taught courses on 
Commodities Law, Derivatives Law, Securities 
Regulation, the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and 
FCMs and other financial law issues since /977. 
Prof Filler is a Public Director and Member of the 
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Executive Committee of the National Futures Associa-
tion, a Public Director and Member of the Regulatory 
Oversight Committee ("ROC") ofSwapEX, a swap 
execution facility owned in part by the State Street 
Corporation and is a Board Member ofGCSA, a 
company that is offering insurance _to CCPs around 
the globe to strengthen their financial resources, es-
pecially in the event of a default. Before joining the 
NYLS faculty in 2008, he was a Managing Director in 
the Capital Markets Prime Services Division at Leh-
man Brothers Inc. in its New York headquarters. Prof 
Filler has co-authored, with Prof Markham, a new 
law book on Regulation of Derivative Financial 
Instruments (Swaps, Options and Futures),published 
by West Academic in May 2014. He also provides 
consulting and expert witness testimony services on a 
variety of financial services law and business 
matters.. You can reach Prof Filler via email at: 
ronald. filler@nyls.edu 
Jerry Markham is Professor of Law, Florida Interna-
tional University at Miami (FlU), He came to FlU 
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
where he was a member of the law faculty for twelve 
years. He had previously taught a course on Com-
modities Regulation at Georgetown for ten years. 
Markham also served as chief counsel, Division of 
Enforcement, US. Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission; secretary and counsel, Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange, Inc.; attorney, Securities and Ex-
change Commission; and a partner with the 
international firm of Rogers & Wells (now Clifford 
Chance) in Washington, D.C. Professor Markham has 
published numerous books and articles on derivative 
· regulation, including a recent book on the law of com-
modity and stock price manipulation entitled Law 
Enforcement and The History of Financial Market 
Manipulation (M.E. Sharpe 2014 ). Mar~ham is the 
chairman of Markham Consulting Inc., which provides 
consulting and expert witness testimony on financial 
market issues including manipulation claims. He is on 
the board of directors of Nomura Derivative Products, 
Inc., a swap dealer. 
Introduction 
On May 6, 2010, the so-called Flash Crash Day, 
the prices of e-mini S&P 500 futures contracts, the 
S&P 500 SPDR and other equity products dramati-
cally dropped in value, followed by an almost imme-
diate recovery. Some $600 billion in market value 
disappeared briefly, and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average plunged nearly 1000 points within a few 
minutes before its recovery. 1 We will refer to the May 
6, 2010 market freefall simply as the "Flash Clash" 
June 2015 I Volume 35 I Issue 5 
although several other names have been used for that 
event. 
A joint-study of the Flash Crash by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) resulted in a 
report that largely blamed the event on a faulty order 
entered by Waddell & Reed, a large mutual fund 
complex. The Joint CFTC/SEC Report stated that: 
"May 6 started as an unusually turbulent day for the 
markets ..... Around 1:OOpm, broadly negative mar-
ket sentiments was already affecting an increase in the 
price volatility of some individual securities. . . ... By 
2:30pm, the S&P 500 volatility index was up 22.5 
percent from the opening level, yields often-year Trea-
suries fell as investors engaged in a 'flight to quality,' 
and selling pressure had pushed the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average ("DJIA") down about 2.5% .... At 
2:32pm, against this backdrop of unusually high vola-
tility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental trader 
(a mutual fund complex) initiated a sell program to sell 
a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at ap-
proximately $4,1 billion) as a hedge to an existing 
equity position,. . . This large fundamental trader 
chose to execute this sell program via an automated ex-
ecution algorithm ("Sell Algorithm") that was pro-
grammed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini mar-
ket to target an execution rate set to 9% of the trading 
volume calculated over the previous minute, but with-
out regard to price or time. . . . However, on May 6, 
when markets were already under stress, the Sell 
Algorithm chosen by the large trader to only target 
trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed 
the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 
minutes ..... 2 
The CME Group conducted its own study of the 
Flash Crash and issued a statement that objected to 
the blame placed on Waddell & Reed by the Joint 
CFTC/SEC Report. 3 The CME noted that Waddell & 
Reed's orders were only a small part of the volume of 
related trades and that traders paid little attention to 
those orders. 
Nanex, a market data provider, also analyzed data 
from the Flash Crash and suggested that high-
frequency traders (HFTs) might have been trying to 
f 2015 Thomson Reuters 13 
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outsmart each other's computers with massive 
amounts of orders that were not intended to be filled. 
It further suggested that HFTs might also have been 
trying to paralyze the exchanges with massive orders 
in order to obtain an advantage over other traders.4 
Another analysis of the trading data by a group of 
economists concluded that HFTs did not trigger the 
crash but that their responses to the abnormally large 
sell orders may have worsened the situation.5 
The Congressional Research Service also examined 
the Flash Crash and other high frequency trader 
concerns. Its report noted this differences in opinions 
on the reason for the Flash Crash, but did not seek to 
resolve those differences.6 The CFTC seemingly stuck 
to its guns on what caused the Flash Crash for over 
four years. Therefore, it came somewhat of a surprise 
when the CFTC announced on April 21, 2015 that it 
had filed a lawsuit against a London trader and his firm 
in which it blamed those defendants as having materi-
ally contributed to the Flash Crash through "spoofing" 
orders that the trader entered from his parents' modest 
home in a London suburb. 7 
This article will examine, among other things, (1) 
the allegations set forth in the CFTC Complaint; (2) 
the theories of liability covering both the pre-Dodd-
Frank Act8 period and the post Dodd-Frank Act pe-
riod; (3) how these differing theories of liability 
compare to other CFTC cases; and (4) whether the 
CFTC will prevail in this case against the defendants. 
Allegations in the CFTC Complaint 
The CFTC's Complaint against the London trader 
and his firm (Navinder Singh Sarao and Nav Sarao 
Futures Limited (collectively, the "Defendants" or 
"Sarao")) charges those Defendants with unlawfully 
manipulating, attempting to manipulate and "spoof-
ing," all with respect to the e-mini S&P futures 
contract.9 Judge Wood of the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois issued an Order Grant-
ing the CFTC's Ex Parte Motion for Statutory Re-
Futures and Derivatives Law Report 
straining Order and Other Relief on April 21, 2015.10 
Also, on April 21, 2015, the U.S. Department of 
Justice filed a Criminal Complaint against Sarao.11 
The CFTC Complaint had been kept under seal 
since April 17, 2015 and was released on April 21, 
2015, when Sarao, a UK resident, was arrested by UK 
authorities at the request of the U.S. Department of 
Justice.12 The Complaint, which will be discussed in 
greater detail below, covers trading by the Defendants 
in thee-mini S&P 500 stock index futures contract for 
the period of April2010 through April6, 2015, during 
which time the Defendants utilized a "Layering" 
Algorithm on over 400 different trading days. 13 Ac-
cordingly, the CFTC is alleging fraudulent trading by 
the Defendants covering both pre-and post-Dodd 
Frank Act standards ofliability. 
The CFTC asserts, in essence, that the Defendants 
engaged in a massive effort to manipulate the CME's 
e-mini S&P 500 futures contracts (hereinafter referred 
to as "S&P e-minis") by "utilizing a variety of excep-
tionally, large aggressive, and persistent spoofing 
tactics" and that Defendants "schemed to design an 
automated system to manipulate the E-mini S&P price 
to their benefit."14 The Complaint further alleges that 
"Defendants' actions caused artificial prices to exist in 
the intra-day price of the lead month of the E-mini 
S&P" on at least twelve trading days during the five 
year period. 15 To achieve this manipulative trading 
activity, the CFTC Complaint alleges that: 
"Defendants utilized an automated 'layering' algoritlun 
(the Layering Algoritlun) that typicaiiy simultaneously 
layered four to six exceptionally large sell orders into 
the visible E-mini S&P central limit order book (Order 
Book). Each seii order was one price level from the 
next, generaiiy beginning at least three or four price 
levels from the best asking price in the Order Book. As 
the market price moved, Defendants' Layering Algo-
rithm automaticaiiy simultaneously moved the large 
seii orders, resulting in the orders remaining at least 
three or four price levels from the best asking price in 
the Order Book. This caused the orders to remain vis-
ible to other market participants in the Order Book, 
14 ~ 2015 Thomson Reuters 
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with very .little risk of the sell orders resulting in a 
consummated trade because each order was several 
price levels above the best asking price."16 
The CFTC alleges that the Defendants "placed 
hundreds of orders for tens of thousands of contracts 
that were modified thousands of times and eventually 
canceled over 99% without ever resulting in a 
trade."17• Also, the CFTC alleges that the Defendants 
" 'flashed' large lot orders in a variety oflot sizes in 
the Order Book that were quickly canceled with no 
intention of these orders resulting in trades (Flash 
Spoofing)," although some orders were executed18 As 
a result of these trading tactics, the CFTC Complaint 
alleges that the Defendants "traded on average $7.8 
billion in notional value, resulting in daily profits av-
eraging approximately $530,000. Defendants profited 
approximately $6.4 million on the twelve" days noted 
above, and $40 million in tota1.19 
The most interesting of the various CFTC allega-
tions is that Defendants used their trading strategies 
on May 6, 2010, the so-called Flash Crash Day, to cre-
ate artificial prices. In support of this allegation, the 
CFTC alleges: 
"Defendants first turned on the Layering Algorithm at 
9:20am CT, placing four orders totaling 2,100 
contracts. These orders were each one tick apart, start-
ing three ticks away from the best ask. The orders were 
modified 604 times over the following six minutes so 
the orders were always at the third level of the sell-side 
of the order book or deeper, and then canceled with no 
executions, as the layering Algorithm was turned off. 
.... While the first cycle of the Layering Algorithm 
was active, Defendant bought 1,606 contracts and sold 
1.032 contracts. 
At 11: 17am CT, Defendants turned the Layering 
Algorithm on for more than two consecutive hours, 
until I :40pm CT. During this cycle, Defendants utilized 
the Layering Algorithm to place five orders, totaling 
3,000 contracts. A sixth order was added at around 
1:13pm CT, increasing the total to 3,600 contracts. 
Between 11:17am CT and 1:40pm CT, Defendants ac-
tions contributed to an extreme order book imbalance 
in the E-mini S&P market. That order book imbalance 
June 2015 I Volume 35 I Issue 5 
contributed to market conditions that caused the E-mini 
S&P price to fall 361 basis points."20 
As a result of the Defendants' trading schemes, the 
CFTC has alleged that the Defendants violated the 
CEA as follows: 
I. Count One: Sections 6(c)21 and 9(a)(2)22 of the 
Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") for the pe-
riod prior to August 15,2011 and CFTC Regula-
tion 180.223 for the period after August 15,2011 
for manipulating the E-mini S&P futures 
contract. 
2. Count Two: Sections 6(c)(3)24 and 9(a)(2)25 of 
the CEA for the period prior to August 15, 2011 
and Sections 6(c)(3), 9(a)(2) and 13(a)(2)26 of 
the CEA and CFTC Rule 180.2 for the period 
after August 15,2011 for attempting to manipu-
late theE-mini S&P market. 
3. Count Three: Section 4c(a)(5)(c)27 of the CEA 
for spoofing of theE-Mini S&P futures contract 
for the period of July 16, 2011 to the present. 
4. Count Four; Sections 6(c)(l)28 and 9(c)(l)29 of 
the CEA and CFTC Rule 180.1 30 for use of 
manipulative devices in connection with trading 
theE-mini S&P futures contract.31 
The CFTC Complaint seeks a host of remedies, 
including civil penalties of the greater of $140,000 or 
three times the monetary gain from each of the thou-
sands of alleged violations of the CEA. 32 
Allegations in the Criminal Complaint 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged most of 
the same facts set forth in the CFTC Complaint 
through an Affidavit of Gregory LaBerta, a Special 
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
("FBI").33 What is interesting is that the Laberta Affi-
davit refers to a "consulting group" that assisted the 
DOJ in connection with its investigation and filing of 
the criminal complaint but this firm is not identified in 
I ~· 2015 Thomson Reuters 15 1 
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the Affidavit. The Affidavit stated that this Consulting 
Group determined that: 
1. Sarao "typically executed a series of trades to 
exploit his own manipulative. activity by repeat-
edly selling futures contracts only to buy them 
back at a slightly lower price." 
2. The Consulting Group "examined over 400 days 
on which Sarao traded E-Minis between April 
2010 and April 2014 . . . and found that Sarao 
used the dynamic layering technique on ap-
proximately 63 percent of those days." 
3. Sarao also repeatedly used a different trading 
technique"l88- and/or 289-lot orders on the sell 
side of the market, nearly all of which he can-
celed before the orders were executed" to "inten-
sify the manipulative effects of his dynamic 
layering technique." 
4. Sarao used a third trading technique whereby he 
"flashed a large 2,000-lot order on one side of 
the market, executed an order on the other side 
of the market, and canceled the 2,000-lot order 
before it was executed."34 
LaBerta also stated that he spoke with another 
expert, who was not identified, who reviewed the 
analyses done by the Consulting Group and opined 
that Sarao's "dynamic layering technique affected the 
market price of the E-Minis during that time period, 
creating artificial prices. 35 
The Criminal Complaint, like the CFTC Complaint, 
alleges that Sarao's actions contributed to the Flash 
Crash.36 In particular, based on analyses done by the 
Consulting Group and the other expert, it was asserted 
that Sarao contributed to the order-book imbalance, 
and was thus a cause of the Flash Crash.37 
The Criminal Complaint charges wire fraud (18 
U.S. C. § 1343); criminal commodity fraud (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1348); criminal manipulation under the CEA (7 
Futures and Derivatives Law Report 
U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)); and criminal spoofing (7 U.S.C. 
§§ 6(a) and 13(a)(2)).38 Those charges carry a maxi-
mum of 380 years in prison if Sarao is convicted on 
all counts and given consecutive sentences. In the 
meantime, Sarao was unable to raise money for bail 
because his assets were frozen worldwide by U.S. 
authorities. 39 
Comparing the Old and the New 
Theories 
The CFTC's Complaint against Sarao contains 
charges of: (1) actual and attempted price manipula-
tion in violation of provisions of the CEA that existed 
before it was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010;40 (2) manipulation under amendments added by 
Dodd-Frank;41 and (3) "spoofing" violations under an-
other provision added by Dodd-Frank. 42 The follow-
ing is an analysis of the elements required to prove 
each of those charges. 
Old School Anti-Manipulation Authority 
The original anti-manipulation prohibitions con-
tained in the CEA, when it was enacted in 1936, were 
at the very heart of the effort by Congress to regulate 
the commodity futures markets. However, the CEA 
failed to define what it meant by manipulation. It was, 
therefore, left to the government and the courts to 
define the term.43 They came up with a four-part test 
that requires the following elements to be proved in 
order to establish an actual commodity price 
manipulation: 
1. The trader had the ability to influence market 
prices; 
2. The trader specifically intended to create an 
artificial price; 
3. An artificial price occurred; and 
4. the trader caused the artificial price.44 
In an attempted manipulation case, the CFTC has 
I 
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asserted that it need only prove specific intent through 
some overt act that was intended to be manipulative.45 
The elements of manipulation and attempted ma-
nipulation under this pre-Dodd Frank authority are 
very difficult to prove. Indeed, while obtaining numer-
ous settlements, the CFTC has won only one adjudi-
cated manipulation case in its forty-year history.46 
The reasons for this difficulty are many. For ex-
ample, prominent economists testifying as experts on 
whether a price was artificial often disagree on that 
issue. Regression analysis by those experts, such as 
the one filed by the CFTC in support of the Sarao com-
plaint, 47 are difficult for a fact finder to understand and 
subject to attack by other experts. In proving that a 
defendant caused an artificial price, opposing experts 
may disagree over whether the price was actually 
artificial. Expert economic analysis claiming that the 
defendant caused an artificial price is often subject to 
criticism for failing to account for every factor that 
might have affected the price.48 
The intent requirement in the old CEA manipula-
tion definition is even more problematic. The CFTC 
has held that "the requisite level of mens rea required 
to prove manipulation or attempted manipulation 
under the Commodity Exchange Act is that of 'specific 
intent,' or as that term is also commonly understood 
to mean today, 'purposeful conduct.' "49 
The CFTC Complaint alleges that the trading at is-
sue was intended to move market prices so that Defen-
dants could profit. However, the fact that a trader is 
seeking to move prices in one direction or another is 
not itself sufficient proof of manipulative intent. As 
the district court held in CFTC v. Delay in a similar 
context: 
Simply stated, it is not a violation of the statute to report 
feeder cattle sales to the USDA with the intention of 
moving the CME index up or down-rather, to be 
unlawful, the reported sales must be sham or nonexis-
tent transactions, or the reports must be knowingly 
false or misleading. In this case, it turns out that the 
sales were real and the reports were true. 5° 
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In this case, as described below, Sarao will un-
doubtedly argue that his trades were real ones because 
he was at market risk. 
New School Anti-Manipulation Authority 
The CFTC's claims under the new Dodd-Frank 
anti-manipulation authority also face some formida-
ble obstacles. The language in that provision was bor-
rowed from Section 1 O(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 ("34 Act"), which prohibits any ""ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.''51 
Under familiar canons of statutory construction, this 
means that this new language in the CEA will be 
interpreted in the same manner as it ha~ been under 
the 34 Act. 52 
The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
feldey53 that the use of the word "manipulative" in 
Section 1 O(b) of the 34 Act was "especially significant. 
It is and was virtually a term of art when used in con-
nection with securities markets. It connotes intentional 
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud 
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the 
price of securities.''54 Later, as it did in the Hochfelder 
case, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe v. Green,55 
defined the term manipulation for purposes of Section 
1 O(b) to refer "generally to practices, such as wash 
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are 
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting 
market activity."56. 
This same approach has been taken in criminal 
cases charging Section 1 O(b) violations. In United 
States v. Mulheren,57 the Second Circuit set aside the 
conviction of the chief trader for a broker-dealer on 
manipulation charges brought under Section I O(b ). 
That trader, John Mulheren, had been told by Ivan 
Boesky that a particular stock was a good buy and that 
it "would be great" if it traded at $45, a price that 
would benefit Boesky's holdings. Mulheren then 
entered an order for the stock at that price. The Second 
Circuit held that this conduct was too ambiguous to 
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support a manipulation charge because there was no 
evidence of trading practices commonly associated 
with manipulation, e.g., wash trades. 
The decision in the Mulheren case gave rise to a 
debate over whether "open market" trades, i.e., bona 
fide orders that are subject to market risk, cannot be 
manipulative because they are real trades, as opposed 
to wash trades, matched tra·des, or other rigged 
trades.58 
Subsequently, in ATSI Communications Inc. v. The 
Shaar Fund Ltd.,59 the defendants were charged with 
engaging in a "death spiral" strategy in which they 
sold short to drive down prices and then covered their 
short position with securities bought at the lower 
prices set by their own short sales. The Second Circuit 
held that manipulation under Section 1 O(b) requires a 
showing that the defendant "engaged in market activ-
ity aimed at deceiving investors as to how other mar-
ket participants have valued a security."60 The inquiry 
that must be made is to determine "whether trading 
activity sends a false pricing signal to the market."61 
In that regard, the Court gives some assistance to the 
Sarao Defendants because it held that short selling in 
large volume to the distress of other market partici-
pants is not in and of itself actionable. Rather, to be 
manipulative, the short sales had to be willfully 
combined with some other activity that created a false 
impression of how market participants were valuing 
the security. 62 
Less helpful to the Sarao Defendants is a decision 
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Markowski v. SEC,63 where the open market trade 
defense was rejected. There, the. defendants were sup-
porting the price of a stock through real bids and 
offers. The Court noted the debate over whether open 
market trades could ever be manipulative, but con-
cluded that the SEC's contra position was not unrea-
sonable, at least under the circumstances of that case. 
However, the Court noted that, in the absence of ficti-
tious trades, it could be difficult to "separate a 'rna-
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nipulative' investor from one who is simply overen-
thusiastic, a true believer in the object of investment. 
Both may amass huge inventories and place high bids, 
even though there are scant objective data supporting 
the implicit estimate of the stock's value."64 In such 
circumstances, legality would "depend entirely on 
whether the investor's intent was 'an investment 
purpose' or 'solely to affect the price of[the] security.' 
"
65 Here, Sarno claims the former as his motive. 
In any event, there are other defenses available to 
Sarno. The 34 Act language was borrowed by Dodd-
Frank in order to reduce the CFTC's burden to prove 
manipulative intent. 66 However, it is not entirely clear 
that the burden will be much different under the new 
provision. The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder67 that scienter must be proven in order 
to prove a claim brought under Section 1 O(b ), i.e., that 
the defendant acted with a mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 68 This 
sounds like a specific intent requirement. 
The Supreme Court has not further defined the stan-
dard for scienter under Section 1 O(b ), but the lower 
courts have concluded that "reckless" conduct is suf-
ficient to establish the requisite intent. However, that 
is still a high standard of proof of intent. The Seventh 
Circuit, which is the circuit where the Sarao cas~ is 
lodged, has defined reckless conduct under Section 
1 O(b) as a "highly unreasonable [act or] omission, 
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to 
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have 
been aware of it."69 This is a very high standard of 
intent and the difference between that standard and the 
specific intent required under the pre-Dodd-Frank 
anti-manipulation authority is apparently slight.70 
The New Spoofing Authority 
The spoofing prohibition cited in the CFTC Com-
18 g: 2015 Thomson Reuters 
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plaint against the Defendants was also added by Dodd-
Frank. That provision prohibits any transaction that 
"is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to 
the trade as, "spoofing" (bidding or offering with the 
intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)."71 
The CFTC contends that Defendants placed hun~ 
dreds of thousands of orders for the E-mini S&P 
futures contract in the near-month with the "intent" of 
cancelling those orders before execution.72 Again, this 
raises the issue of the degree and nature of the required 
intent because, as noted below, Saro contends that he 
was engaged in a bona fide market strategy that 
required frequent cancellations. 
The CFTC issued an interpretive guidance and 
policy statement after the anti-spoofing provision was 
added to the CEA by Dodd-Frank in which it ad-
dressed the issue of intent in spoofing cases. 73 The 
CFTC stated that a trader must be shown to: 
"act with some degree of intent, or scienter, beyond 
recklessness to engage in the 'spoofing' trading prac-
tices prohibited by CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C). Because 
CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C) requires that a person intend 
to cancel a bid or offer before execution, the Commis-
sion does not interpret reckless trading, practices, or 
conduct as constituting a spoofing violation. Addition-
ally, the Commission interprets that a spoofing viola-
tion will not occur when the person's intent when 
cancelling a bid or offer before execution was to cancel 
such bid or offer as part of a legitimate, good-faith at-
tempt to consummate a trade."74 
This specific intent requirement will be difficult to 
meet. 
The CFTC interpretive statement also stated that 
spoofing would occur where a party submitted or 
canceled bids or offers with the intent to create artifi-
cial price movements upwards or downwards. 75 This 
raises the issue of whether Defendants thought they 
were responding to market changes or whether they 
were seeking to create such price changes artificially. 
This new spoofing authority has been attacked in 
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another criminal case, United States v. Coscia, 76 as 
being void for vagueness. Although the district court 
rejected that claim in that case, it may have some 
credence on appeaF7 The word "spoofing" is certainly 
a vague term. It appears to have originated as the name 
of a card game invented by a comedian in the 1880s. 
It was also later used as a term to describe a harmless 
hoax or gentle mocking of another person.78 
Spoofing appears to have been applied in the first 
instance in financial markets to a form of an Internet 
scam. The spoofer in those cases sent out mass emails 
with false originating addresses in an effort to manip~ 
ulate the price of a stock. For example, a blast email 
would be sent out that falsely indicated that the officer 
of a public company was publishing information that 
would have market effect. The perpetrator would trade 
in advance of the email and profit from the market 
reaction. 79 
The new use of the term spoofing, i.e., to prohibit 
orders not intended to be filled, is a far different crea-
ture than that originally attacked in the email cases. 
This suggests that the term can be given any meaning 
desired by regulators and provides little guidance on 
what is permitted and what is prohibited. In that 
regard, the use of the term spoofing in the context of 
cancelling orders conflicts with other permitted mar-
ket practices. 
Historically "flash" orders, i.e., orders that are 
flashed and immediately canceled, have long been 
considered to be permissible because they can attract 
trading interest to a market. 80 "Pinging" is another 
permissible practice that involves the entry of an or-
der that is immediately cancelled. These orders are 
used as a means to determine if there is a trader on the 
sidelines seeking a better than existing market price. 
The pinging order seeks to draw out that interest from 
dark pools or other venues. This is considered a 
permissible practice because the order may be exe-
cuted before cancellation. This raises a vagueness is-
sue because there is no clear line between pinging, 
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flash trades and spoofing.81 As noted in the New York 
Times: 
High-frequency traders often 'ping' different markets 
by sending orders to gauge interest in a stock, and more 
than 90 percent are estimated to be -canceled. That is 
not spoofing because there is a chance the order will be 
filled but illustrates the fine line between accepted prac-
tices and illegal conduct.82 
As the CFTC has also noted with respect to manipu-
lation claims, "a clear line between lawful and unlaw-
ful activity is required in order to ensure that innocent 
trading not be regarded with the advantage of hind-
sight as unlawful manipulation."83 That bright line 
may not exist in the Sarao case. 
Prior Cases 
There is not a lot of helpful precedent through 
which to analyze the Sarao case under the old CEA 
manipulation provisions. Manipulation cases brought 
under that authority tend to be in one of three classes: 
(1) market power in which the trader has control of 
supply and a corresponding futures position; (2) false 
reports of trading activity at artificial price levels; and 
(3) rigged trades. The Sarao case does not fit well into 
any of those categories. 
Presumably, the CFTC will argue that the Defen-
dants' trading was some form of rigged trade, which 
was the basis for its only success in an adjudicated 
manipulation proceeding. In that case, In the Matter 
of Diplacido, 84 the Second Circuit in an unpublished 
opinion, upheld a CFTC administrative decision, 
which held that a trader engaged in manipulation by 
"banging the close" with orders that violated the bids 
and offers of other traders. There does not appear to 
be any such conduct in this case. 
An earlier decision by a hearing officer in the 
Department of Agriculture, which predated the CFTC, 
found manipulation where a trader bought up all the 
orders posted on the close of trading in constant 
ascending prices and then offered and bought at even 
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higher prices.85 This was found to be manipulation 
but it too does not seem to fit this case. 
The CFTC also settled a pre-Dodd-Frank manipula-
tion case by consent in which it charged that the re-
spondent traded on the CME with the intent to "push" 
the prices of nonfat dry milk futures contracts higher. 86 
The respondent was seeking to establish a large short 
position in those same futures contracts with the hope 
that the market would then sell off and allow a profit. 
The CFTC charged that the trader attempted to ma-
nipulate futures prices higher by (I) executing trades 
by 'lifting' offers, and then immediately bidding a 
higher price than just paid in the trade; (2) placing 
both bids and offers above prevailing market prices 
across multiple contract months in order to establish 
higher price ranges in the market; and (3) consistently 
placing bids above the opening price or the prevailing 
price across multiple contracts. This case was based 
on the premise that traders normally buy low and sell 
high, while here the trader was allegedly buying high 
rather than low. This too does not seem to fit the Sarao 
facts. In any event, that case was settled by consent 
and therefore, may have little precedential effect. 
With respect to the "layering" charges under the 
new Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority, the SEC 
and FINRA have brought actions making such claims 
under the 34 Act. 87 In a case that was settled by 
consent, the SEC defined layering/spoofing as follows: 
"Layering concerns the use of non-bona fide orders, or 
orders that the trader does not intend to have executed, 
to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price not 
representative of actual supply and demand. More 
specifically, a trader places a buy (or sell) order that is 
intended to be executed, and then immediately enters 
numerous non-bona fide sell (or buy) orders for the 
purpose of attracting interest to the bona fide order. 
These non-bona fide orders are not intended to be 
executed. The nature of these orders is to induce, or 
trick, other market participants to execute against the 
initial, bona fide order. Immediately after the execution 
against the bona fide order, the trader cancels the open, 
non-bona fide orders, and repeats this strategy on the 
opposite side of the market to close out the position."88 
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The CFTC brought an earlier layering/spoofing 
case, which was similar to those brought by the SEC. 
In In the Matter of Panther Trading LLC,89 the CFTC 
charged that respondents placed small orders to sell 
futures that wanted executed, followed quickly by sev-
erallarge buy orders at successively higher prices that 
they intended to cancel before execution. The buy 
orders were intended to give the impression that there 
was significant buying interest that would lift prices. 
This increased the likelihood that the respondents' 
small sell order would be executed, raising the likeli-
hood that other market participants would buy from 
the small order. This process would then be reversed 
with a small buy order and several sell orders that 
would be canceled. These cancellations were done 
very quickly, but the Defendants' order imbalance of-
fers remained open for some time even as they were 
being adjusted for all the market to see. In any event, 
the Panther case was settled by consent and without 
any admission of wrongdoing. 
Also of interest is CME Rule 575, which prohibits 
certain disruptive trading practices. Specifically, that 
rule states that "[n]o person shall enter or cause to be 
entered an order with the intent, at the time of order 
entry, to cancel the order before execution or to 
modify the order to avoid execution." The CFTC com-
plaint states that Sarao is a member of the CME,90 but 
that exchange has brought no action against him. 
Moreover that rule is premised on business principles, 
not on criminal or statutory manipulation.91 In con-
trast, the government is seeking to crirninalize such 
conduct through Sarao and other cases. 
Does the Government Have a Case? 
The facts in the Sarao case appear to be, in at least 
some aspects, sui generis, which will require a review 
of those unique facts to determine if the conduct in 
question was manipulative or intended to be 
disruptive. The filing of the complaint in CFTC's case 
against Sarao was accompanied by a Declaration by a 
CFTC investigator,92 the Declaration of Professor Ter-
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renee Hendershott, w professor at the University of 
California at Berkeley Business School,93 and emails 
from Sarao detailing his trading strategies and giving 
instructions on how to modify his trading system to 
accommodate his trading strategies.94 This documen-
tation allows an unusual opportunity for an analysis of 
the strength of each party's case before trial. 
Sarao will likely argue that his trades were bona 
fide positions that put him at risk and that he did not 
have any manipulative intent. Indeed, Sarao so stated 
to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in London, 
i.e., "[m]y orders are 100% at risk, 100% of the 
time."95 Also, according to the CFTC Complaint, 
Sarao was a very successful trader who netted profits 
totaling $40 million from his trading strategies.96 If 
so, this presumably reflects the fact that there was 
considerable risk in his trading. This is because the 
amount of risk in an investment or trade is usually 
commensurate with the possible reward. The CFTC's 
expert report also concedes that, albeit in small 
amounts, some ofthe away-from-the-market orders 
entered by Sarao were actually executed before they 
could be canceled.97 
Sarao also documented the reason for his practice 
of entering and cancelling orders to keep them away 
from the best bid or offer, which is the crux of the 
government's case: 
"The other orders I sometimes place during the day are 
slightly away from the market price and move up and 
down as the market moves with it. This is to catch any 
blips up/down in the market so that I can make a small 
profit as the market comes back into line (almost 
immediately). These orders are placed rarely and only 
when I believe the market is excessively weak or 
strong. Again, this was inspired by other traders I could 
see doing the exact same thing."98 
This strategy might have had price effect, but all 
volume traders will affect the market price. Moreover, 
if taken at his word, Sarao seems to believe that mar-
ket forces rather than his orders were causing the mar-
ket correction. This could negate a claim of manipula-
tive intent. 
II 
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Another wrinkle in this case is the fact that its filing 
resulted in worldwide headlines because the govern-
ment in April 2015 charged that Sarao's trading had 
contributed to the Flash Crash that occurred on May 
6, 2010.99 However, if his trading actually had such a 
massive destabilizing effect, why did it take the 
government so long to figure out his role? Instead, the 
government, after much investigation, initially con-
cluded that its cause lay elsewhere. Further, as noted 
by the New York Times, if Sarao's trading was so 
destabilizing, and it is charged that he was trading 
often, why did it not crash the market on other occa-
sions?100 
Another gap in this case is a failure by the govern-
ment or its expert to explain why the market dropped 
simply because Sarao's algorithm kept his order at a 
given distance from the best bid or offer. The Com-
plaint makes numerous references to the fact that these 
orders created an imbalance on the sell side, but why 
did the market react to an order that was keeping a 
constant distance from better orders? Did the market 
react the same way for every order imbalance created 
in this manner? If not, why not? And why did not mar-
ket participants just ignore the Defendants' orders, 
which could readily be observed displayed on the or-
der book at always a constant distance from the best 
offer? 
Another question lacking an answer is why did 
high-frequency-traders (HFTs) not adjust their algo-
rithms to profit from any market effect caused by 
Sarao's orders? Sarao was a relatively unsophisti-
cated, and very slow trader. In his words, he was "an 
old school point and click prop trader" who used a 
mouse for order entry and a limited algorithm to move 
the order imbalance as the market changed. 101 As the 
New York Times noted, HFTs in the market "could 
reasonably be expected to adjust their algorithms to 
recognize the type of orders he used and discount their 
likely effect on prices."102 
Sarao also pointed out to the FCA that he was trad-
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ing on a very popular U.S. market from London 
without a high speed trading line. 103 In contrast, his 
competition, the HFTs, have co-located servers in 
Chicago and have access to high-speed communica-
tion lines.104 As Saro stated to the FCA, he was at a 
disadvantage to the HFTs: 
"Certainly not for a guy like me who is trading from 
the UK and who's system is miles too slow compared 
to these people due to ihe fact that my orders have to 
travel further than everyone else's who are trading in 
the USA. No wonder they can manipulative (sic) on 
top of my orders without any risk, for even when I 
change my mind and decide to sell into my buy order, 
the manipulative orders disappear in the 4 milliseconds 
it takes for my buy order to be canceled and replaced 
with my sell order ·so that I do not trade with my-
self!!! !"105 
Sarao further complained to the FCA that others 
were manipulating the market through fake orders and 
were taking advantage of his orders. Sarao asserts that 
95 percent of HFT orders are not "genuine" or "pos-
sibly even tradable."106 Saro seems to be claiming that 
he is defending himself from the HFTs, as opposed to 
manipulating the market. This seems to be confirmed 
by a newspaper report that Sarao made over 100 
complaints to the CME over the course of several 
years about the trading activities of HFTs that he 
claimed were manipulative.107 
Surely, the nimble HFT traders would have spotted 
this order imbalance phenomenon allegedly created 
by Sarao and took advantage of his relatively large 
latency in order entry. Surely, large institutional trad-
ers in the market would have spotted this strategy if it 
was really impacting the market and responded to rob 
Sarao of this opportunity. How then could Sarao 
defeat the HFTs except, as he claims, his "intuition" 
was the reason for his trading success? 
In seems from Sarao' s view that he discovered a 
market flaw, developed a trading strategy that allowed 
him to avoid the predations of the HFTs and which 
was successful. Sarao, it appears, does not understand 
22 £' 2015 Thomson Reuters 
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why is he prohibited from using a successful trading 
strategy, especially since he views the HFTs as the 
real villains in the market. Further, Sarao actually ex-
ecuted trades and made money. So, he must be provid-
ing liquidity to someone? In all events, it is difficult to 
understand how the Defendants' trading was a cause 
ofthe Flash Crash.108 
Conclusion 
The case against Sarao raises many interesting is-
sues, but it is an ad hoc approach to regulation that 
provides little guidance for traders. What is needed 
are exchange controls that limit cancellations of orders 
that .c<:mtinually create an order imbalance at a given 
distance from the market. In that case, there would be 
no need for doubtful criminal and civil charges against 
traders seeking to take advantage of market flaws, as 
traders have done since time immemorial. 
(c) FiUer and Markham 
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FROM THE EDITOR 
Congratulations Derivatives Law 
Graduates 2015 
It is June, the month for graduations, parties and 
proms. Derivatives University Law School (DULS) 
had its commencement last week. The graduation 
speaker was Dr. Karla Marks, the Chairwoman of the 
new Bitcoin Swap Execution Facility (Bitcoin SEF). 
Dr. Marks congratulated the students on completing 
three years of grueling study. In her commencement 
speech, Dr. Marks told the DULS graduates they must 
never stop learning, they must always keep up with 
regulatory developments, and they should never stop 
asking the CFTC the hard questions. She told the 
students that with all the problems facing our coun-
try-threats in the Middle East, terrorism, economic 
stagnation, poverty, financial system instability, polic-
ing incidents, climate change - they should reflect on 
the following 8 crucial questions. 
1. Were Bitcoins "commodities" before and/or af-
ter the CFTC approved of their being traded on 
the Bitcoin SEF? 
2. Will requiring margin to be posted by com-
mercial end-users for uncleared swap threaten 
the creation of jobs, or will it create more and 
innovative back-office jobs for margin profes-
sionals? 
3. What is the correlation between the Second 
Circuit's May 7, 2015 decision invalidating the 
National Security Agency's telephone metadata 
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collection practices and the CFTC's proposed 
exemption for commodity trading advisors' 
recordkeeping obligations for text messages and 
recorded phone calls? 
4. What is the basis for the CFTC's jurisdiction 
over aluminum warehouses located in the United 
States that are owned by the London Metals 
Exchange, which is regulated by the United 
Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority? 
5. What would the CFTC's position be if Delaware 
commodity pools offered only to United States 
investors that have sleeves managed by Euro-
pean trading managers were characterized as 
"EMIR Persons" for EU regulatory compliance 
purposes? 
6. Do trade options that have been transacted for 
centuries by commercial entities pose such a 
threat to the U.S. financial system that they need 
to be regulated by the CFTC? 
7. Has the CFTC created legal certainty as to their 
regulatory status as. swaps for commercial deliv-
erable physical commodity forward contracts 
that have embedded volumetric optionality? 
8. Is the LIBOR rate a "commodity" regulated by 
the CFTC and, if your answer is yes, why? 
Dr. Marks went on to warn the DULS graduates to 
use sun screen, drink plenty of water, act ethically and 
read every law firm's client alerts on the CFTC's 
swaps rules that you can find on Google. Her parting 
words were: "May the retail forex be with you." 
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